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Charles Hawksley* 
University of Wollongong, Australia 
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The possibility of an ‘arc of instability’1 across the Western Pacific states of Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji carries serious security concerns for 
the entire Pacific region. This paper examines Australian-led interventions in Papua 
New Guinea and the Solomon Islands to analyse the effects that they are having on 
the concept of sovereignty, both for states in the Western Pacific region and for 
international relations more generally. It argues that the nation-state ideal is under 
severe strain and that failed states are symptomatic of a wider problem of legitimacy, 
caused in part by the liberal assumption underpinning the social contract that entail 
one the one hand protection and on the other service delivery. As many states fail in 
this respect of delivering the political goods — rule of law, security, infrastructure, 
medical care and civil and human freedom — the notion of sovereignty has now been 
exposed for the fiction it has essentially been for most states, at least in the 20th 
century. If states cannot provide then intervention and state reconstruction marks a 
return to the nation-building project that characterised post WWII international 
politics. It also invites questions of diminished sovereignty and forces a reassessment 
of the capacity of states to meet the expectations of their citizens. It may be that the 
time has come to think beyond state sovereignty as the basis of international order and 
to return to imperial or semi-imperial constructs, particularly forms of indirect rule, to 
guarantee global human security. If states are failing then sovereignty is expendable.
* The author thanks the Faculty o f  Arts, University o f  W ollongong, for funding to attend the 2005 
Australasian Political Studies Association  Conference at the University o f  Otago, Dunedin, New  
ZealSnd.
The amorphous nature of Sovereignty
Since at least the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the notion of sovereignty has been 
central to the study of international relations. Sovereignty has generally been seen as a 
set of claims that politically organised groups occupying a defined territory make to 
other groups occupying different territories. Such claims centre on the group’s right to 
be regarded as self-governing, that they are capable of managing their own affairs and 
that others should keep out of their defined territory and their political affairs. For 
these claims to exist and to be recognised some form of central constituted authority, 
such as a government administration, is required. This power can then attempt to 
enforce its writ over the people who live within its boundaries, and to exclude all 
external influences. It becomes, in effect, the sovereign power of the state. This is a 
view that sees sovereignty as absolute and as a shibboleth of modern statehood. For 
international law to function states require the capacity to enter into treaties as equals, 
so by extension sovereignty implies a legal equality between the political states of the 
world. States would further claim to resit external influences in their decision-making 
processes. Even if the absolute notion of sovereignty is a fiction, it is a necessary one, 
as the international political system was constructed on this principle.
Rejecting the absolutist approach to sovereignty by arguing that it has been 
consistently undermined, Stephen Krasner has usefully picked apart the concept to 
suggest that there are in fact four central ideas that create sovereignty:
■ Domestic sovereignty — the classical interpretation where the state as 
sovereign controls all activity within its borders.
■ Interdependence sovereignty — the ability of a state to seal its borders to 
prevent the entry or exit of people or commodities.
■ International legal sovereignty — the acceptance by other states of a state’s 
right to exist, and to give it recognition as a state.
■ Westphalian sovereignty — other states refraining from interference in the 
domestic politics of any state.2
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Krasner argues that for as long as sovereignty has been around it has been a flawed 
concept. It is partial and it is consistently diminished by the actions of other states. 
Fowler and Bunk argue a similar position, analysing legal precedents in international 
politics that encroach on the absolute rights of states.3 However as Philpott argues, 
neither approach actually negates either the claims that states make to hold 
sovereignty nor the validity of the concept itself.4 The decades from the 1940s to the 
1970s resulted in the universalisation of the nation-state project. Claims for state 
sovereignty were a feature of decolonisation as peoples around the world struggled for 
self-determination. States and government around the world are now similar in that at 
the national level they all have bureaucracies and ministries and they all claim 
national sovereignty. Largely because of decolonisation the number of states in the 
international state system has also grown, from around 50 in 1900 to over 200 in 
2005, yet only a handful operate according to the principles of liberalism, democracy, 
civil society, rule of law and free trade, the characteristics regarded as being essential 
to guarantee human security. As Kaplan has observed, many states are states in name 
only.5 With around 200 states, many suffer from various levels of dysfunction, and 
sometimes in ‘weak’ states this dysfunction becomes critical, even terminal. The 
spectre of the ‘failed state’ — or the even more serious ‘collapsed state’— has given 
rise to situations where in the partial or complete absence of legitimate state control 
over its own territory, the international respect for the notion of sovereignty is deemed 
to be of secondary importance to the possible problems that disorder will produce.6 
The effects of state collapse are just as dangerous for those inside the state as those 
without. It is increasingly clear that in the post-Cold War world of increased 
connection through globalisation, some states are now willing to override the notion 
of state sovereignty for purposes of their own, or for regional or international security.
Sovereignty and failed states
‘Failed state’ describes a situation in which an internationally recognised government 
is either unwilling or incapable of asserting control over its domestic affairs. Though
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it may claim a right to sovereignty, the evidence of its demonstrable inability to 
restrict crime, impose centralised order or even control its own territory, indicates that 
it has lost legitimacy within its own borders. This is not to suggest that total anarchy 
reigns over a failed state, rather that forms of order may spring up with localised and 
often violent power structures exerting control over regions and communities. The 
category of the failed state thus covers a variety of situations such as complete state 
collapse and descent into warlordism (Somalia), civil war driven by ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
(Bosnia), or civil war driven by a contest for power (Cambodia).7 In these cases, the 
internationally recognised government (if one exists or can be identified) is not able to 
bring forces within the state under its control, and it cannot seem to achieve a peaceful 
political solution, either through intransigence or simple incapacity.
What is most apparent in the study of failed states is the geographic specificity of the 
phenomena. It happens most in what was the former colonial world, and mostly in the 
‘new states’ created by decolonisation. The failed or failing state is prominent in 
Africa and parts of Asia, but the atypical example was the fracture of Yugoslavia.8 
The Western Pacific’s apparent ‘arc of instability’ may indeed be evidence of this 
phenomenon in the antipodes.
Apart from the obvious human cost, failed states are thought to encourage trade in 
armaments, narcotics, people (both women and children) and wildlife. The possibility 
of terrorism being fostered in collapsed states has recently emerged as a significant 
security problem. Dupont claims criminal groups are drawn to jurisdictions where 
enforcement is weak or absent, for in such an environment the profits may be 
unchecked. Activities prohibited elsewhere can exist. The United Nations 
Development Program’s 1999 Human Development Report estimated profits from the 
activities of organised crime syndicates to total c. US$1.5 trillion dollars an amount 
that at the time would have ranked it about fourth in the world as a ‘national 
economy’. The chief revenue rasing activities that may be going on in failed states are 
said to be:
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■ drugs (particularly heroin, cocaine, and more recently amphetamines and 
ecstasy)
■ corruption (kickbacks, extortion, bribes, kidnapping)
■ money laundering (often from drug profits)
■ people trafficking (sex trade in women and children, irregular migration)
■ firearms (gun running)
■ terrorism (covering both the criminal aspects and the fundraising aspects of 
non-state actors and other political groups).9 (Ibid, 200-205).
Failed or failing states can be havens for general lawlessness and transnational crime, 
and, as Alan Dupont notes, “in some states crime and politics are virtually 
indistinguishable, either because the state has been co-opted by criminals or because 
the people who run the state are themselves criminals.”10 Failing states may be lax in 
enforcing their own rules, or they may even have no rules, but in a collapsed state the 
administrative bureaucracy essentially ceases to exist. Criminal elements may come to 
operate and inhabit part or all of the country, but they do so without the official 
sanction or cooperation of the recognised government. The adherence of a collapsed 
state to international law is threatened as, even though the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda means states are bound by the international treaties they sign,11 the signature 
of a state on an international instrument is only as good as its will or capacity to 
enforce its own laws. In collapsed states, capacity is absent and failure to prevent 
criminal activities from occurring represents significant dangers for neighbouring 
states.
As failed states have become a major issue over the past decade, the study of how to 
prevent state failure has also become an established part of social science literature, 
particularly in sub-disciplines of international relations such as peace and conflict 
studies. The upsurge in the number of post-cold War peacekeeping missions prompted 
the creation in 1994 of the US State Failure Taskforce. This body attempted to 
analyse the phenomenon of state failure and collapse with a view to predicting its 
incidence and probability. Headed by then Vice-President A1 Gore, the Taskforce had
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the job of collecting and collating data from ‘high-risk’ countries and devising a set of 
warning signs and indicators for when failure was probable. It was government 
funded and staffed by social scientists, experts in data collection and consultants in 
statistical methods. This Taskforce defined state failure as comprising:
■ revolutionary wars — where a group attempts to overthrow the ruling regime;
■ ethnic wars — conflicts where ethnic, religious or communal minorities seek 
changes in status;
■ genocides and politicides — state sponsored deaths of communal or minority 
groups;
■ adverse or disruptive regime transitions — when a state becomes unstable or 
shifts toward authoritarian rule to prevent collapse.12
The method utilised gathered data for the two years prior to when a state was deemed 
to have failed and contrasted it with control data with three instances of non-state 
failure in the same year. It estimated that under this classification there had been 114 
instances of state failure between 1955 and 1998, in some of the 195 countries 
considered. It then predicted the probability of states (as a number between 0 and 1) 
of a state suffering the complete or partial collapse of their authority. A score of 0.5 
would mean that a state had an equal chance of failing as it did of surviving; closer to 
0 the state’s survival became more assured, closer to 1 the prognosis was that the state 
was becoming unstable and heading for collapse. On assessing their data the taskforce 
refined their ‘drivers’ of state failure:
■ quality of life (including infant mortality);
■ regime type (the level of democracy — refined further into the classifications 
of full democracy, partial democracy and autocracy);
■ the ethnic or religious composition of the state; and
■ international influences, including the degree of trade openness.
As the Taskforce saw it, the failure of states affects development and democracy, as 
well as the growth of individual liberty and free trade. Where states had high infant 
mortality, low international trade openness and two or more bordering conflicts, the
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likelihood that they would fail was double. Where the regime was a partial democracy 
failure was up to seven times higher.13
This is a circular argument. States with lower levels of development tend to have 
higher infant mortality, and are more likely to be ruled by the gun than the ballot box. 
They are normally colonial constructs uniting a variety of ethic groups so they are 
also diverse. Placed under centralised power, and in the absence of developed civil 
society groups to balance state power with public freedom, conflict is perhaps 
inevitable, especially if the state does not perform in service delivery. It is hardly 
surprising that marginalised groups within states have few reasons to support 
centralised control and will attempt to gain power themselves to improve their 
conditions. The Taskforce’s methodology basically de-historicised the conditions 
under which states had developed and concentrated on indices and numbers as 
predictors. King and Zheng’s study of the Taskforce’s model and results found that it 
also drastically overestimated the likelihood of state failure. They argue the 
Taskforce’s drives are actually more likely to be indicators of state failure. Low levels 
of democracy, low trade openness and high infant mortality tell you more about how a 
failing state operates — what has already happened in a state — than why a state may 
later fail. In some states it may be possible that nothing works as it would in a 
developed state, although the state does not implode or collapse.14
Ultimately whether a state is stable or unstable, collapsing or not collapsing, appears 
to be a matter mostly of international, not domestic, perception. Some weak states 
should probably fail but survive; other weak states appear to be failing and then 
suddenly collapse.15 When a state truly collapses (such as in Somalia in 1991) the 
international community moves, as ‘something must be done’. Debates over what to 
do when a state collapses return to the vexed notion of sovereignty. In the struggle to 
gain territory and to assert claims of internal and international legitimacy, innocent 
civilians, including women and children, are the main casualties. The recent refusal 
of the international community to allow humanitarian catastrophes to go unchecked
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has prompted the solution of stopping the killing by overriding state sovereignty 
through armed intervention.
Sovereignty and Intervention
The international community does not have a specific or particular plan for 
responding to the failure of a state, although intervention followed by nation building 
is fast becoming the norm for failed states. The scope and mandate of UN and 
regional assistance missions has varied greatly, from tens of thousands of troops in 
monitoring and assistance roles in Cambodia, to similar numbers with peace 
enforcement responsibilities in the Congo, to a handful of observers in Bougainville. 
The ultimate purpose of all such interventions is to recreate a workable state of affairs 
through confidence and security building measures, capacity building, commerce and 
aid. In line with the idea that the way to ‘fix’ states is to reconstruct them, rather than 
to allow them to disintegrate and create wider instability, these processes are 
generally termed ‘nation-building’ (or more aptly ‘nation re-building’) and require a 
form of temporary occupation. In Berger’s wide-ranging definition, nation-building 
can encompass formal military occupation, counter-insurgency, peacekeeping,
1 finational reconstruction, foreign aid and the use of stabilization forces.
Fukuyama’s recent State Building argues that culture is the least easily adapted 
element essential for functioning states.17 The types of Westminster style 
administrative and governmental systems developed for PNG, Solomon Islands, Fiji 
and other Pacific states do not perhaps address the perceived needs of their people. 
This is complex territory; examinations of other interventions in Cambodia and East 
Timor assist in placing what is happening now in the Pacific in historical context. To 
change culture is not impossible, but it does require long term planning and the 
existence of institutions that function rests to a certain extent on the desire to have 
such institutions. At this level, it becomes a chicken and egg argument. Intervention 
and state re-building may create the desire for public institutions. The question is 
whether they are appropriate for the societies they administer. Nation building
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involves a large component of outside direction in the construction of administration 
in a state. Sovereignty has never been absolute, but struggling states are now being 
subjected to renewed efforts to make them fit the liberal mould, which may or may 
not be appropriate for all societies and cultures.
Interventions are justified by a report by the Canadian government-sponsored 
initiative, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty that 
claims there now exists not so much the ‘right to intervene’ but a wider ‘responsibility 
to protect ’. Governments have a duty to care for their populations, but when they are 
either unwilling or unable to do so, then “ ... interventionary measures by other 
members of the broader community of states may be required”.18 The total respect 
for sovereignty has now become partial. The new doctrines of peacekeeping involve 
intervention and deployments of advisers, aid workers, police and troops. This shift 
from ‘first’ to ‘second’ generation peacekeeping was a move from a relatively simple 
role of entering a conflict with the consent of parties to monitor ceasefires, to the 
more complex role of multifunction operations, many of which suffer from ‘mission 
creep’ and expanding mandates. The activities taken on by intervening forces have 
also been transformed, due to more complex mandates and more challenging 
circumstances. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor was 
effectively operating as a ‘state-in-waiting’; the United Nations Interim Mission in 
Kosovo has created an international protectorate zone within the sovereign state of 
Serbia.
Because of the inability to get UN missions on the ground quickly, even despite high 
levels of violence and widespread deaths, interventions are often perceived as 
occurring ‘too little too late’. By the time the UN or another force actually goes into a 
state to prevent humanitarian catastrophe, many people have already been killed or 
displaced, and damage to people and property is often widespread. Episodes such as 
Rwanda, where the Security Council scaled down the UN’s commitment due to the 
apparent dangers (only to result in one of the centuries worst genocides) pointed to a 
need to redefine the peacekeeping mission. The ‘Brahimi report’ of 2000
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recommended, among other things, the formation of an international UN standing 
force.19 Recent international relations literature is studded with such references to ‘the 
right to intervene’ and ‘the responsibility to protect’ but due to the costs of long term 
commitments states are often unwilling to lend forces to the UN until an appropriate 
exit strategy has been formulated.20
Regional organizations have emerged as alternatives to UN interventions and may be, 
in some cases, more appropriate or more effective. They have the benefit of 
understanding the context and of de-politicising the problems as they may avoid the 
obligatory references to be US, French or British neo-colonialism. In Africa the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have authorised missions 
to, amongst other states, Cote d’Ivoire21 while the African Union has been present in 
Darfur in Sudan. These aim to separate parties and build peace; with Africans policing 
other Africans, there is a greater degree of ownership over the peace process. In the 
Pacific however the asymmetries of state power make intervention even more 
asymmetrical.
Sovereignty and Intervention in the Western Pacific
In the Western Pacific the past decade has proved increasingly difficult for small 
island states, and to some extent their much larger neighbours such as Fiji and PNG. 
Economic difficulties have added to the pressure to downsize administrations and led 
to a crisis in governance in some states. The situation in the Western Pacific has 
deteriorated to the point where Australia has altered its previous respect for the 
sovereignty of Pacific states and is now choosing to intervene where it perceives 
problems exist, or may exist in the future. This has been done through the Pacific 
Islands Forum in the Case of the Solomon Islands, but unilaterally in the case of 
Papua New Guinea.
In the Pacific the viability of small states remains as problematic now as when 
independence was first gained in the 1960s and 1970s. Size of domestic markets,
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small populations, high unemployment, high migration, high transport costs and a 
lack of lack of infrastructure mean that many Island states compete against each other 
for a limited share of the import market to Australia and New Zealand.22 Economic 
problems compound the absence of effective governance and allegations of corruption 
in Pacific governments abound. Tuvalu is the exception to the rule, mostly through 
the good fortune of being allocated the abbreviation ‘tv’ when the internet domain 
names for countries were allocated.23 Despite having large phosphate reserves Nauru 
has squandered its fortunes through a series of poor investment decisions. Financial 
problems compound the likelihood of perversion of proper governmental process. In 
2001 Australia purchased the compliance of Nauru and PNG in housing asylum 
seekers for a reported AUD$20 million each.24. By any measure, the ‘Pacific solution’ 
indicated the asymmetry of power in the Pacific. As the regional superpower, 
Australia had of course been the dominant power in the Western pacific. The 
difference now was that Australia was becoming less interested in respecting the 
sovereignty of Pacific States and more interested in fixing perceived problems of non- 
compliance and instability.
With very small Western Pacific states, aid and economic pressure are used to force 
changes to policies and behaviour. When implicated in money laundering to the tune 
of $80bn, Nauru was placed on the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) list of non- 
compliant countries and territories.25 In under-funded states that lack the capacity to 
combat new forms of economic or security threat, such as money laundering and 
terrorism, Australia assists by providing ready-made criminal legislation to strengthen 
the capacity of a government to combat crime. The Australian Federal Police work to 
support governance and law with all Pacific states through the Law Enforcement 
Cooperation Program. 26 The effectiveness of any such measures depend on the 
existence of an functional state structure and government that is considered to be 
legitimate.
Sometimes further steps are required, and higher degrees of intervention are 
contemplated. In the case of RAMSI, a parlous state of affairs in the Solomon Islands
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had existed since 1999. There was an attempt in 2000 to establish a regional policing 
force (the International Peace Monitoring Team) to observe the fragile peace created 
by the Honiara Peace Accord and the Panatina Agreement (both of 1999), and the 
Buala Peace Conference and the Auki Peace talks of May 2000.27 In January 2003 
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer had claimed “Australia is not about to 
recolonise the south Pacific, nor should it. These are independent sovereign countries 
with their own constitutions”.28 By May 2003, the idea for an armed intervention 
force took hold. The Department of Foreign Affairs has stated that the main factor in 
the intervention was the degree of willingness of other Pacific states to override the 
notion of state sovereignty; the Solomon Islands government also wanted an 
intervention force and neighbouring Pacific islands agreed to i t 29
Ostensibly a multi-country taskforce, RAMSI is Australian dominated and Australian- 
led. The idea that through intervention the sovereignty of the Solomon Islands state 
can be restored is clearly problematic; sovereign states do not normally allow armed 
foreign troops to deploy on their territory, unless under visiting forces agreements. 
There are exceptions to this, including the Vanuatu government in 1979 permitting 
PNG troops to assist it in putting down an insurrection, however the idea that a state 
requires others to guarantee law and order goes to the heart of the problem. The 
results in the Solomon Islands appear impressive, and from its initial deployment in 
May and June 2003 the security situation has certainly stabilised. The Australian 
police (Federal and State) and their Pacific counterparts, both Solomon islanders and 
those from other countries such as New Zealand, Tonga, Fiji and Vanuatu, have 
collected a large number of improvised and manufactured weapons and arrested 
people on charges of murder. Arguably this sort of intervention was effective as the 
force deployed was overwhelming both in terms of numbers and firepower, and once 
the weapons collection was mostly complete, the community policing has re­
established trust in institutions as a basis of civil society. RAMSI was required 
because of the total breakdown of administration in the islands, a situation where no 
body accepted the right of the government to govern. How long it will stay is not 
known, although the ‘whole of government’ approach requires a comprehensive
12
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rebuilding of institutions so it may be the next generation of Solomon Islands leaders 
who bid farewell to RAMSI.30
Where RAMSI had regional support, even through an Australian led Pacific islands 
forum, the case for PNG is quite different. The Enhanced Cooperation Program 
(enshrined as the Joint Agreement on Enhanced Cooperation of 13 August 2004) was 
designed to assist the capacities of the Papua New Guinea State. Clearly, Australia 
fears state collapse in PNG and the ECP has been Australia’s initiative. Mike 
Manning claims it was PNG’s idea, but the offers no actual evidence and the 
historical record suggests otherwise.31 In December 2003, the governments of 
Australia and Papua New Guinea concluded the Enhanced Cooperation Program 
(ECP) agreement that aims, amongst other things, to increase the capacity of the PNG 
state to develop something called good governance. This term is bandied about with 
monotonous regularity as if its meaning is clearly understood. It can describe anything 
from public sector ‘reform’, downsizing/’rightsizing’ of government bureaucracies 
and the abolition or creation of administrative practices.
For PNG the ECP meant accepting over 200 Australian Federal Police (AFP) and 
other officers as assisting police personnel, along with some 64 other advisers, to act 
in bureaucratic managerial and actual policing roles (DFAT 2004). While Australia 
has historically provided legal officers and key advisors to PNG as part of the general 
aid programme, this is the most ‘hands-on’ approach by Australia to perceived 
failures in PNG governance since PNG became independent in 1975. The idea of 
Australian bureaucrats and police was strongly resisted by elements within the PNG 
government during early 2004 and the agreement was not finalised until July of that 
year. Ultimately PNG accepted the ECP because it had no choice to refuse. But there 
is still a sovereign state and the sting in the tail for Australia was when the PNG 
supreme court ruled the provision of sovereign immunity to police personnel 
contravened the country’s constitution. Australia insists on immunity for its officers, 
PNG will not accept it. At the time of writing no solution has been found, but the 
advisers, a term reminiscent of colonial advisers in protectorates who managed the
13
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affairs of state, remain. They exercise control over spending and budgetary 
processes.32
Conclusions: unequal sovereignty
Both of these Pacific interventions have occurred because Australia fears for its own 
security and because of Australian understandings that others outside of the region, 
principally the US, expect it to be a serious contributor to world order.33 Token 
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan help, but to be viewed as a serious contributor to 
the Western alliance Australia has to be seen to promote stability in its own sphere of 
influence. Australia’s capacity to contribute to a coalition of international powers rests 
on its ability to enforce the rule of law in the relatively small countries of the Pacific. 
These concerns about state stability and the supremacy of law reflect the 1904 
Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe doctrine which argued that civilised states need to 
intervene in situations of general concern. In its own return to the Roosevelt corollary, 
the US has adopted the role of state conqueror and re-builder in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The neo-conservative administration argues that its unchallenged power should be 
used to construct ‘just’ states — those that will respect the civilisation norms of 
international law. In the Western Pacific the US clearly sees the compliance of states 
with the rule of law as case Australia’s responsibility. As a part of the Western 
alliance Australia must do its bit for stability in the Pacific.
The two Pacific cases mirror events elsewhere in the world and call into question the 
equality of sovereign states in international relations. It may well be that the nation­
state project has failed in many parts of the world, including in the Pacific, but nation­
states remain. The critical test of state viability appears to be a state’s capacity to 
deliver political goods in return for obedience and order. When the state reneges on its 
half of the bargain, it becomes irrelevant to its own citizens; if it then turns coercive to 
enforce compliance they have every right to resist. We may be shifting to a ‘post­
sovereignty’ world as the importance of sovereignty as an organising principle in 
international relations is under severe challenge though interventions that vary in
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scope and intensity. Those states that invite intervention or have intervention thrust 
upon them are clearly struggling to be effectively sovereign. If they cannot control 
their own territory they are less than equal to states that can. They remain states in the 
sense that the international community accepts a patch of territory has a name but the 
new interventionism has important consequences for international relations. If, 
following realism, the ability to project power decides the standards of justice that 
exists within societies, then Australia’s economic, military and political power will 
create justice in the Pacific. If however, in the process of intervening, Australia 
approaches the Pacific with heavy-handed dealings in supposedly independent states 
then it diminishes its effectiveness and capacity to create viable institutions. The 
difficulty lies in being effective without looking like interfering or being ‘imperial’.
The two Pacific cases demonstrate emerging norms of intervention: they are unilateral 
or regional rather than (multilateral in the sense of the UN); they aim to build or 
rebuild the state; they are armed; and they are there for the long term. While the 
RAMSI commitment has been spoken about in terms of ten years, the ECP funding 
was for five years. If PNG’s problems are as severe as many commentators seem to 
think,34 the ECP appears to be a band aid solution. In any case, it may not now go 
ahead, or certainly not in the same form. Neither intervention has a clear criteria for 
success, and thus no clear exit strategy can be deduced. Perhaps Australia, like the 
US, now considers that temporary occupation or ‘empire lite’ is a necessary evil if 
national security, and to an extent regional security, is to be maintained. Interventions 
of this sort herald the death of the concept of sovereignty for nations experiencing 
difficulty, especially those thought to be potentially collapsing states. Aid and 
interference in administration re-creates the indirect rule of the colonial period. 
Indirect rule or even empire lite is clearly a more realistic response to the possibility 
of state collapse than observing sovereignty as the reconstruction of state authority 
requires long-term capacity building. If the security of larger nations is perceived to 
be at risk they will act to intervene and create solutions that are more suitable. In the 
words of Teddy Roosevelt
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Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening o f  
the ties o f  civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require 
intervention by some civilized nation, and .... may force the United States, 
however reluctantly, in flagrant cases o f  such wrongdoing or impotence, to 
the exercise o f  an international police power.35
One hundred years later the new muscular Australian policy is neither reluctant nor 
apologetic. The results of these Pacific interventions are important for Australia’s 
position in the world, but for the peoples of the Pacific Islands, mending their states, 
through whatever means, is vital as it will enable them to regain ownership over their 
lives and their countries. In the modem world of human security, sovereignty is no 
longer the shibboleth of statehood it once was.
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